Abstract-Rigorous privacy-preserving mechanisms that can process and analyze dynamic data streams in real time are required to encourage a wider adoption of many largescale monitoring and control systems recording the detailed activities of their users, such as intelligent transportation systems, smart grids, or smart buildings. Motivated by scenarios where signals originate from many sensors capturing privacy-sensitive events about individuals and several statistics of interest need to be continuously published in real time, we consider the problem of designing multi-input multi-output (MIMO) systems processing event streams, while providing certain differential privacy guarantees on the input signals. We show how to construct and optimize MIMO extensions of the zero-forcing mechanism, which we previously proposed for single-input single-output systems. Some of these extensions can take a statistical model of the input signals into account. We illustrate our privacypreserving filter design methodology in two examples: privately monitoring and forecasting occupancy in a building equipped with multiple motion detection sensors, and analyzing the activity of a Markov chain model of a simple shared processing server.
which can provide important societal benefits, new tools are needed to provide clear privacy protection guarantees and allow users to balance utility with privacy rigorously [6] .
Offering privacy guarantees for a system generally involves sacrificing some level of performance, and evaluating the resulting tradeoffs rigorously requires a quantitative definition of privacy. Various such definitions have been proposed, such as disclosure risk [7] in statistics, k-anonymity [8] , informationtheoretic privacy [9] , or conditions based on observability [10] , [11] . However, in the last few years, the notion of differential privacy has emerged essentially as a standard specification [12] , [13] . Intuitively, a system processing privacy-sensitive inputs from individuals is differentially private if its published outputs are not too sensitive to the data provided by any single participant. This definition is naturally linked to the notion of system gain for dynamical systems (see [14] and [15] ). A general concern in privacy-related research is how to provably limit the risk of privacy breaches caused by an adversary managing to link information published based on a sensitive dataset with other (often publicly) available information, as in [8] , [16] , and [17] for example. One operational advantage of differential privacy compared to some other definitions is that it provides strong guarantees without involving the difficult task of modeling all the potentially available auxiliary information.
Differential privacy is a strong notion of privacy, but might require large perturbations to the published results of an analysis in order to hide individual data. This is especially true for applications where users continuously contribute data over time, and it is thus important to carefully design real-time mechanisms that can limit the impact on system performance of differential privacy requirements. Previous work on designing differentially private mechanisms for the publication of time series include [18] , [19] , but these mechanisms are not causal and hence not suited for real-time applications. The mechanism described in Section IV of this paper could also be interpreted as a dynamic causal version of the matrix mechanism introduced in [20] for static databases. The papers [21] [22] [23] describe real-time differentially private mechanisms to approximate a few specific filters processing a stream of 0/1 variables, representing the occurrence of events attributed to individuals. For example, papers [21] and [22] consider a private accumulator providing at each time the total number of events that occurred in the past. This paper is inspired by this scenario and builds on our previous work on this problem in [14, Sec. IV] and [15, Sec. VI] . Here, we extend our analysis in particular to multi-input multi-output (MIMO) linear time-invariant (LTI) systems, which considerably broadens the applicability of the scheme to more common situations, where multiple sensors monitor an environment and we wish to concurrently publish several statistics of interest. An application example is that of analyzing spatiotemporal records provided by networks of simple counting sensors, e.g., motion detectors in buildings or inductive-loop detectors in traffic information systems [24] . The literature on the differentially private processing of multidimensional time series is still very limited, but includes [25] , which considers a single-input multiple-output (SIMO) filter, where each output channel corresponds to a moving average filter with a different size for the averaging window, as well as [26] , which discusses an application to traffic monitoring.
To summarize, the contributions and organization of this paper are as follows. In Section II, we present a new generic scenario, where we need to approximate a general MIMO LTI system by a mechanism offering differential privacy guarantees for the input signals. The formal definitions necessary to state the problem are also provided in that section. In Section III, we perform some preliminary system sensitivity calculations that are necessary in the rest of this paper. Section IV presents a general approximation scheme for MIMO systems that provides differential privacy guarantees for the input signals. The design methodology and performance of the privacy-preserving filter are illustrated in Section V in the context of a building occupancy estimation problem. Note that Sections III-V provide a more detailed presentation of the theoretical and simulation results contained in our conference paper [2] . Finally, Section VI presents an additional privacy-preserving mechanism that can approximate the desired outputs more closely but requires the second-order statistics about the input signals to be publicly available. It extends to the MIMO case some of the results presented in our conference paper [1] . This section also illustrates the relationship between our problem and certain joint transmitter-receiver optimization problems arising in the communication systems literature [27] , [28] .
Notation: Throughout this paper, we use the following standard abbreviations: LTI for linear time-invariant, SISO for single-input single-output, SIMO for single-input multipleoutput, and MIMO for multiple-input multiple-output. Unless specified otherwise, we consider discrete-time signals starting at time 0, dynamical systems or filters are assumed causal, and (for simplicity of exposition) transfer functions or transfer matrices G(z) = ∞ t=0 G t z −t have real-valued coefficients. We fix a base probability space (Ω, F, P ). We denote the multivariate normal distribution with mean vector μ and covariance matrix Σ by N (μ, Σ). 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Generic Scenario
We consider m sensors detecting events, with sensor i producing a discrete-time scalar signal {u i,t } t≥0 ∈ R, for i ∈ [m]. In a building monitoring scenario for example, the sensors could be motion detectors distributed at various locations and polled at regular intervals, with u i,t ∈ N the number of detected events reported for period t. We denote u the resulting vector-valued signal, i.e., u t ∈ R m . An LTI filter F , with m inputs and p outputs, takes input signals u from the sensors and publishes output signals y = F u of interest, with y t ∈ R p . In our example, we might be interested in continuously updating real-time estimates of the number of people in various parts of the building, as well as short-and medium-term occupancy forecasts, in order to optimize the operations of the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning system. The problem considered in this paper consists in replacing the filter F by a system processing the input u and producing a signalŷ as close as possible to the desired output y (minimizing, for example, the mean square error (MSE) lim T →∞
, while providing some privacy guarantees to the individuals whose activities are captured by the input signals u. The privacy constraint is explained and quantified in the next subsection.
B. Differential Privacy
As mentioned in the introduction, a differentially private mechanism publishes data in a way that is not too sensitive to the presence or absence of a single individual. A formal definition of differential privacy is provided in Definition 1. In the previous building monitoring example, one goal of a privacy constraint could be to provide guarantees that an individual cannot be tracked too precisely from the published (typically aggregate) data. Indeed, Wilson and Atkeson [29] , for example, demonstrate how to track individual users in a building using a network of simple binary sensors such as motion detectors. 1) Adjacency Relation: Formally, we start by defining a symmetric binary relation, denoted Adj, on the space D of datasets of interest, which captures what it means for two datasets to differ by the data of a single individual. Essentially, it is hard to determine from a differentially private output which of any two adjacent input datasets was used. Here, D := {u : N → R m } is the set of input signals, and we have Adj(u, u ) if and only if we can obtain the signal u from u by adding or subtracting the events corresponding to just one user. Motivated again by applications to spatial monitoring, we consider in this paper the following adjacency relation:
parameterized by a vector k ∈ R m with components k i > 0. According to (1), we wish to make it hard to detect deviations on each input signal component at any single time period (here, δ t i denotes the discrete impulse signal with impulse at t i ), and by at most k i . Let e i ∈ R m be the ith standard basis vector, i.e., with coordinates e ij = δ ij , j = 1, . . . , m. Then, for two adjacent signals u and u , we have with the notation in (1)
Note in passing that we could place additional constraints on k to capture additional knowledge about the problem, which can help design mechanisms with better performance, as we discuss later. For example, if we know that a given person can activate at most l < m sensors and each k i is 1, we can add the constraint |k| 1 ≤ l. The adjacency relation (1) extends the one considered in [15] and [21] [22] [23] to the case of multiple input signals. It places two constraints on the influence that an individual can have on the input data in order for our differentially private mechanisms to offer him guarantees. First, any given sensor can report an event due to the presence of the individual only once over the time interval of interest for our analysis. This is a sensible constraint in applications such as traffic monitoring with fixed motion detectors activated only once by each car traveling along a road, certain location-based services where a customer would check-in say at most once per day at each visited store, or certain health-monitoring applications where an individual would report a sickness or visit the emergency room only once. For a building monitoring scenario however, a single user could trigger the same motion detector several times over a relatively short period. A first solution to this issue consists in splitting the data stream of problematic sensors into several successive intervals, each considered as the signal from a new virtual sensor, so that an individual's data are present only once in each interval. A MIMO mechanism can then process such data and offer guarantees, addressing one of the main issues for the applicability of the model proposed in [21] and [22] . However, increasing the number of inputs degrades the privacy guarantees or the output quality that we can provide. Hence, in general, no privacy guarantee will be offered to users who activate the same sensor too frequently. The second constraint imposed by (1) is that we bound the magnitude of an individual's contribution by k i , but this is not really problematic in applications such as motion detection, where we can typically take k i = 1.
2) Definition of Differential Privacy: Mechanisms that are differentially private [12] , [30] , [31, Def. 2.4] necessarily randomize their outputs, in such a way that they satisfy the property of Definition 1. Following these references, the term "mechanism" here simply refers to a randomized map M from some input space D of datasets to some output space R of published results. So, for d ∈ D, M (d, ·) is a measurable map from our sample space Ω to R. We follow, however, the standard practice of omitting the argument ω ∈ Ω when we denote the random variable M (d).
Definition 1: Let D be a space equipped with a symmetric binary relation denoted Adj, and let (R, M) be a measurable
If δ = 0, the mechanism is said to be -differentially private.
This definition quantifies the allowed deviation for the output distribution of a differentially private mechanism, given any two adjacent input datasets d and d . One can also show that it is impossible to design a statistical test with a small error to decide if d or d was used by a differentially private mechanism to produce its output [32] , [33] . In this paper, the space D was defined as the space of input signals, and the adjacency relation considered is (1). The output space R is the space of output signals R := {y : N → R p }. Finally, a differentially private mechanism will consist of a system approximating our MIMO filter of interest F , as well as a source of noise necessary to randomize the outputs and satisfy (3) . We also refer the reader to [14] and [15] for a technical discussion on the (standard) σ-algebra M used on the output signal space to offer useful guarantees.
3) Sensitivity: Enforcing differential privacy can be done by randomly perturbing the published output of a system, at the price of reducing its utility or quality. Hence, we are interested in evaluating as precisely as possible the amount of noise necessary to make a mechanism differentially private. For this purpose, the following quantity plays an important role.
Definition 2: The 2 -sensitivity of a system G with m inputs and p outputs with respect to the adjacency relation Adj is defined by Δ m ,p 2
4) Basic Differentially Private Mechanism:
The basic mechanism of Theorem 1 (see [15] ), extending [30] , can be used to answer queries in a differentially private way. To present the result, we recall first the definition of the Q-function
and define κ δ, = 1 2 (ξ + ξ 2 + 2 ). Theorem 1: Let G be a system with m inputs, p outputs, and with 2 -sensitivity Δ m ,p 2 G with respect to an adjacency relation Adj. Then, the mechanism M (u) = Gu + w is ( , δ)-differentially private with respect to Adj if w = {w t } t≥0 is a p-dimensional Gaussian white noise, with
G.
Proof: Let u and u be adjacent signals. For all T ≥ 0, we have
G which implies by [15, Th. 3] that releasing the sequence (M (u)) 0:T is ( , δ)-differentially private, for any T ≥ 0. The result is then a consequence of [15, Lemma 2].
The mechanism M described in Theorem 1, which provides a differentially private version of a system G, is called an output-perturbation mechanism. We see that the amount of noise sufficient for differential privacy with this mechanism is proportional to the 2 -sensitivity of the filter and to κ δ, , which can be shown to behave roughly as O(ln(1/δ)) 1/2 / . Note that we add noise proportional to the sensitivity of the whole filter G independently on each output channel, even if G were diagonal say; otherwise, trivial attacks that simply average a sufficient number of outputs could potentially detect the presence of an individual with high probability [15] .
In conclusion, we could obtain a differentially private mechanism for our original problem by simply adding a sufficient amount of noise to the output of our desired filter F , provided that we can compute its sensitivity, which is the topic of the next section. However, it is possible, in general, to design mechanisms with much less overall noise than this output-perturbation scheme, as discussed in Sections IV and VI.
III. SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS
For the following sensitivity calculations (see Definition 2), the H 2 norm of an LTI system plays an important role. We recall its definition for a system G with m inputs
A. Exact Solutions for the SIMO and Diagonal Cases
Generalizing the SISO scenario considered in [14] and [15] to the case of a SIMO system, we have immediately the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (SIMO LTI system): Let G be an LTI system with one input, p outputs and such that G 2 < ∞. For the adjacency relation (1), we have Δ 1,p
and the bound is attained if
For a system G with multiple inputs, the special case where G is diagonal, i.e., its transfer matrix is
, also leads to a simple sensitivity result. Note that, in this case, we have G
Theorem 3 (Diagonal LTI system): Let G be a diagonal LTI system with m inputs and outputs, such that G 2 < ∞. For the adjacency relation (1), denoting
Proof: If G is diagonal, then for u and u' adjacent, we have from (2)
where g ii denotes the impulse response of G ii . Hence
and |α i | ≤ k i , for all i. Again, the bound is attained if |α i | = k i for all i.
B. Upper and Lower Bounds for the General MIMO Case
For MISO or general MIMO systems, the sensitivity calculations are no longer so straightforward, because the impulses on the various input channels, obtained from the difference of two adjacent signals u and u , all possibly influence any given output. Still, the following result provides simple bounds on the sensitivity.
Theorem 4: Let G be an LTI system with m inputs, p outputs, and such that G 2 < ∞. For the adjacency relation (1),
Proof: 
where the last inequality results from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
For the lower bound, let us first take u ≡ 0. Then, consider an adjacent signal u with a single discrete impulse of height k i at time t i on each input channel i, for i = 1, . . . , m, with
waiting for the effect of impulse i on the output to be sufficiently small, we can choose the signal u such that
Since this is true for any η > 0 and Gδ t i e i
We can compare this bound to the situation, where G is diagonal, in which case the sensitivity is exactly k 1 G 2 from Theorem 3. The following example shows that the upper bound of Theorem 4 cannot be improved for the general MISO or MIMO case. 
C. Exact Solution for the MIMO Case
For completeness, we give in this subsection an exact expression for the sensitivity of a general finite-dimensional MIMO LTI filter. Let G be a stable finite-dimensional LTI system with m inputs, p outputs, and state-space representation
with x 0 = 0. Recall the definition of the observability Gramian P 0 , which is the unique positive-semidefinite solution of the equation
Let B i and D i be the ith column of the matrices B and D, respectively, for i = 1, . . . , m. Finally, define for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, i = j, and τ in Z
Theorem 5: Let G be a stable finite-dimensional LTI system with m inputs, p outputs, and state-space representation (5). Then, for the adjacency relation (1), we have
Proof: In view of (2), we have
For y i = Gδ t i e i and y = m i=1 α i y i , we have , given in the theorem. First,
Then, if t i = t j , we find that
The case t i > t j is symmetric. Hence, we find that S t i ,t j ij depends only on the difference τ = t i − t j , and our notation (6) corresponds to S τ ij := S t i ,t i +τ ij . In (7), the maximization over interevent times τ still needs to be performed and depends on the parameters of the specific system G. This result could be used to evaluate carefully the amount of noise necessary in an output perturbation mechanism, but unfortunately it seems too unwieldy at this point to be used in more advanced mechanism optimization schemes, such as the ones discussed in the next sections.
Still, expression (7) provides some intuition about the way the system dynamics influence its sensitivity. In particular, the second term in (7) can give insight into the gap between the sensitivity and the lower bound in (4) . Note from the expression of S τ ij in (6) that one way to decrease the sensitivity of G is to increase sufficiently the required time |t i − t j | between the events contributed by a single user, in order for A |t i −t j | 2 to be small enough. Hence, a lower bound on interevent times in different streams could be introduced in the adjacency relation to reduce a system's sensitivity. This would weaken the differential privacy guarantee but help in the design of mechanisms with better performance. Another possibility would be to have a privacy-preserving mechanism simply ignore events from a given user as long as the lower bound on interevent times is not reached. 
IV. ZERO-FORCING MIMO MECHANISMS
Using the sensitivity calculations of Section III, we can now design differentially private mechanisms to approximate a given filter F , as discussed in Section II-A. The mechanisms described below generalize to the MIMO case some ideas introduced in [14] . The general approximation architecture considered is described in Fig. 1 
In this section, we fix the system H to be of the form H = F L, with L a left inverse of the prefilter G, i.e., such that L(z)G(z) = I m , assuming such an L exists. We call the resulting mechanisms zero-forcing equalization (ZFE) mechanisms, and we denote e ZFE mse (G, L) := e mse (G, H) in this case. It was shown in [14] for the SISO case that this setup allows significant performance improvements compared to the output-perturbation mechanism. The latter is recovered when G = F and H is the identity.
A. SIMO System Approximation
First, let us assume that F in Fig. 1 is a SIMO filter, with p outputs. Hence, for all ω, F (e j ω ) is a complex-valued pdimensional vector. The next theorem gives a condition on the optimal filters G and L minimizing (8) for the ZFE architecture described above, which allows us to construct them, and shows that one can take these optimal ZFE filters to be SISO.
Theorem 6: Let F be a SIMO LTI system with F 2 < ∞. For any SIMO LTI system G such that G 2 < ∞ and with a left-inverse L, we have
Suppose moreover that F satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition
and any such G, L achieves the lower bound (9) and satisfies
Theorem 6 generalizes [15, Th. 8] to the SIMO case. Finding G SISO satisfying (10), G 2 < ∞ and with causal inverse L = G −1 is a classical spectral factorization problem; see [34] , for example, for more details on how to construct G from this frequency-domain condition.
Proof: Consider a first stage
* , and thus in particular
and
From Theorem 2, the sensitivity of the first stage for input signals that are adjacent according to (1) Fig. 1 is differentially private. The MSE for this mechanism can be expressed as
using the fact that w is white Gaussian noise and a property of the H 2 norm. We are thus led to consider the minimization of F L
where in the last equality we used (11) . Now, consider the inner product f, g = 1 2π
g(e j ω )dω on the space of 2π-periodic functions with values in C q . By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for this inner product applied to the functions ω → |F (e j ω )| 2 M (e j ω ) and a p × 1 transfer matrix, for i = 1, . . . , m. ω → G(e j ω ), we obtain the following bound:
i.e., using (12),
Also, the two sides in the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality are equal, i.e., the bound is attained, if
Note that this condition does not depend on q. Hence, we can simply take q = 1 and multiply (13) by G(e j ω ) * to get |G(e j ω )| 2 = |F (e j ω )| 2 , which is (10). Since |F (e j ω )| 2 is an nonnegative function on the unit circle, integrable on [−π, π] (consequence of F 2 < ∞), if it satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition, it has indeed a (minimum phase) spectral factor G with causal inverse satisfying (10) almost everywhere [34, p. 199 ]. Finally, F L 2 = G 2 is a straightforward consequence of the stronger condition (10).
B. MIMO System Approximation
Let us now assume that F has m > 1 inputs. We write F (z) = [F 1 (z), . . . , F m (z)], with F i a p × 1 transfer matrix. In this case, in view of the complicated expression (7) for the sensitivity of a MIMO filter, we only provide a suboptimal ZFE mechanism, together with an estimate of the gap between the performance of our mechanism and that of the optimal ZFE mechanism.
1) Diagonal Prefilter Optimization:
The idea is to restrict our design to prefilters G that are m × m and diagonal, with squared sensitivity equal to (Δ m ,m 2
G)
. . , k m ), according to Theorem 3. We then consider the architecture shown in Fig. 2 , where the signal w is a white Gaussian noise with covariance matrix κ 
If moreover each F i satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition 
In other words, the best diagonal prefilter for the MIMO ZFE mechanism can be obtained from m spectral factorizations of the functions ω →
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 6, the MSE for the mechanism of Fig. 2 can be expressed as
with
, assuming that the inverses exist. Now, remark that F G
|G i i (e j ω )| 2 dω. Hence, from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality again, we obtain the lower bound 
where · 2,1 is the so-called L 2,1 or R 1 matrix norm and appears in [35] for example.
2) Comparison With Nondiagonal Prefilters:
For F a general MIMO system, it is possible that we could achieve a better performance with a ZFE mechanism for which G is not diagonal, i.e., by combining the inputs before adding the privacypreserving noise. To provide a better understanding of how much could potentially be gained by carrying out this more involved optimization over general prefilters G rather than just diagonal prefilters, the following theorem provides a lower bound on the MSE achievable by any ZFE mechanism.
Theorem 8:
where F (e j ω )K * denotes the nuclear norm (i.e., sum of singular values) of the matrix F (e j ω )K.
The lower bound (16) on the MSE achievable with a general prefilter in a ZFE mechanism should be compared to the performance (14) that can actually be achieved with diagonal prefilters. Note that these bounds coincide for m = 1. For m > 1, the gap depends on the difference between the integrals of the L 2,1 norm and the nuclear norm of F (e j ω )K (see Fig. 7 for an illustration).
Proof:
With the lower bound of Theorem 4, designing a ZFE mechanism based on sensitivity as above would require adding a noise with variance at least κ
2 . This would lead to an MSE at least equal to κ
2 . Now, note that 
and so e
where F (e j ω )K * = Tr(A(e j ω )) denotes the nuclear norm of the matrix F (e j ω )K.
V. APPLICATION TO PRIVACY-PRESERVING ESTIMATION OF BUILDING OCCUPANCY
In this section, we illustrate the design process and the performance of the ZFE mechanism in the context of an application to filtering and forecasting occupancy-related events in an office building equipped with motion detection sensors. As mentioned in Section II-B, such sensor networks raise privacy concerns since some occupants could potentially be tracked from the published information, especially when it is correlated with public information such as the location of their office. Since the amount of private information leakage depends on the output signals the system aims to generate, we adjust the privacy-preserving noise level based on the filter specification using the ZFE mechanism.
As an example, we simulate the outputs of a 3 × 15 MIMO filter processing input signals collected during a sensor network experiment carried out at the Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories (MERL), described in [38] and in Fig. 3 . We refer the reader to [37] for examples of identification of individual trajectories from this dataset.
The original dataset contains the traces of 213 sensors placed a few meters apart and spread over two floors of a building, where each sensor recorded with millisecond accuracy over a year the exact times at which they detected some motion. For illustration purposes, we downsampled the dataset in space and time, summing all the events recorded by several sufficiently close sensors over 3-min intervals. From this step, we obtained 15 input signals u i , i = 1, . . . , 15, corresponding to 15 spatial zones (each zone covered by a cluster of about 14 sensors), with a discrete-time period corresponding to 3 min and where u i,t is the number of events detected by all the sensors in zone i during period t. Let us assume say that during a given discrete-time period, a single individual can activate at most four sensors in any zone; hence, k i = 4 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 15. Moreover, we need to assume that a single individual only activates the sensors in a given zone once over the time interval for which we wish to provide differential privacy. Section II-B discussed how to relax this requirement by splitting the input data into successive time windows and creating additional input channels.
Suppose that we want to compute simultaneously and in real time the following three outputs from the 15 input signals
where 1) y 1 is the sum of the simple moving averages over the past 60 min for zones 1 to 5, i.e., f 1 (z) = 1 20 19
2) y 2 is 12 i=5 f 2 u i , with f 2 a low-pass filter with Gaussian-shaped finite impulse response of length 20, obtained using MATLAB's function gaussdesign(0.5,2,10). 3) y 3 is the scalar output of a 1 × 15 MISO filter f 3 designed to forecast at each period t the average total number of events per time period that will occur in the whole building during the window [t + 60 min, t + 90 min]. This filter was constructed by identifying an ARMAX model [39] between the 15 inputs (plus a scalar white noise) and the desired output, with the calibration done using one part of the dataset. The model chosen takes the form
where a 1 , . . . , a 4 and b 0 , b 1 are scalar and row vectors, respectively, forming the filter f 3 , c 1 is a scalar, and e t is a zero-mean standard white noise input postulated by the ARMAX model for system identification purposes. Fig. 4 shows sample paths over a 72-h period of the second and third outputs of the desired filter and of its (ln 5, 0.05)-differentially private approximation obtained using the ZFE MIMO mechanism with a diagonal prefilter. The 15 optimal prefilters were obtained approximately via least-squares fit of |F i (e j ω )| 2 with negligible approximation error (using MATLAB's function yulewalk implementing the YuleWalker method [40] ), rather than true spectral factorization as mentioned in Theorem 7. One apparent feature of the privacypreserving outputs seen in Fig. 4 is that the noise level is independent of the size of the desired output signal; hence, low signal values tend to be easily buried in the noise. This is one drawback of mechanisms relying on global sensitivity measures and additive noise. Another noticeable element is the fact that the noise remaining on each output can have quite different characteristics depending on the desired filter F , with the postfilter F G −1 removing more high-frequency components on the second output than on the third.
Referring to (14) for the performance achieved with diagonal prefilters as here and the lower bound (16), we obtain for the filter F designed in our example
Hence, compared to the performance potentially achievable with general prefilters, using diagonal prefilters degrades the rootmean-square error (RMSE) by a multiplicative factor of at most 2.2. Note also from (14) and (16) that the dependence of the ZFE mechanism performance with respect to the parameters and δ is captured simply by the factor κ δ, .
VI. EXPLOITING SECOND-ORDER STATISTICS ON THE INPUT SIGNALS
One issue with zero-forcing equalizers is the noise amplification at frequencies where |G(e j ω )| is small, due to the inversion in H = F G −1 [41] . This issue is not as problematic for the optimal ZFE mechanism, since in this case the amplification is compensated by the fact that |F (e j ω )| and |G(e j ω )| given in Theorem 7 are both small at the same frequencies. Nonetheless, in general, one can improve on the ZFE mechanism by using more advanced equalization schemes in the design of the postfilter H of Fig. 1 , and we discuss one such scheme in this section. Note, however, that the mechanisms presented below require that the input signals satisfy certain properties, such as wide-sense stationarity, and that some publicly available information on these signals be available, e.g., their second-order statistics. Hence, the ZFE mechanism remains generally useful due to its broad applicability, even in the absence of any model of the input signal dynamics.
A. Linear Minimum Mean-Square-Error (LMMSE) Mechanisms
One can improve on the ZFE mechanism if some information on the statistics of the input signal u is publicly available. In general, constructing the optimum maximum-likelihood esti- Fig. 1 is computationally intensive and requires the knowledge of the full joint probability distribution of {u k } k ≥0 [41] . Hence, we explore in this subsection a family of simpler schemes based on LMMSE estimation, which we call LMMSE mechanisms.
Assume that it is publicly known that u is wide-sense stationary (WSS) with known mean vector μ and matrix-valued autocorrelation sequence
T , ∀k. Without loss of generality, we can assume μ to be zero, since the output y is also WSS with known mean equal to F (1)μ. The zspectrum matrix of u is denoted P u (z) =
For simplicity of exposition, P u (z) is assumed to have rational entries and be positive definite on the unit circle, i.e., P u (e j ω ) 0, for all ω ∈ [−π, π). More generally, given two vector-valued WSS signals u and v, we denote the cross-correlation matrix
All z-spectra are assumed to be rational, and in particular, we do not discuss the case of spectra with impulses [42] . Referring again to the architecture of Fig. 1 , an LMMSE mechanism is characterized by a choice of prefilter G and the use of a Wiener filter H to estimate y from v [34] , [43] . Recall that the Wiener filter produces an estimateŷ minimizing the MSE between y andŷ over linear filters, assuming that the signals y, v are WSS with known second-order joint statistics. Here, these statistics can be expressed in terms of those of u, w, and of the transfer function G. The main contribution of this section is to derive a numerically computable lower bound on the MSE achievable by LMMSE mechanisms for which the prefilter G is diagonal. The lower bound provides an estimate of how far a specific choice of such diagonal G is from the optimum choice. Our procedure involves the following steps. For the derivation of the lower bound, we assume for tractability reasons that H is an infinite impulse response Wiener smoother, i.e., not necessarily causal. The reason is that we can then express the estimation performance analytically as a function of G. We then optimize this performance measure over diagonal prefilters G.
For specific implementations of causal LMMSE mechanisms, two natural choices are discussed. First, we can take the prefilter G obtained from the computation of the lower bound and design for H a causal Wiener filter, or perhaps a slightly noncausal filter if it can be implemented by introducing a delay that is tolerable for a specific application. This mechanism will not attain the lower bound in general, since the bound and corresponding G were obtained by removing the causality constraint on H. Another possibility is to take G as in the ZFE mechanism and simply replace H = F G −1 by a Wiener filter. This choice has the advantage of always improving on the ZFE mechanism and tends to perform well in practice.
1) Lower Bound on MSE:
The (noncausal) Wiener smoother H has the transfer function H(z) = P y v (z)P v (z) −1 [34, Sec. 7.8] . According to Theorem 3, for G diagonal, we can take the privacy-preserving noise w to be white and Gaussian with covariance σ 2 I m with σ 2 = κ 2 δ, GK 2 2 . Since u and w are uncorrelated, we have
Hence
The MSE can then be expressed as e LMMSE mse
Tr(P y (e j ω ) − Pŷ (e j ω ))dω [34, Ch. 7] . In our case,
where on the last line and in the following, we often omit the argument e j ω next to matrices to simplify the notation. Let us denote P u (e j ω ) = Δ(e j ω )Δ(e j ω ), where Δ(e j ω ) 0 is the principal square root of P u (e j ω ). We have then 
where again the arguments e j ω where omitted. The objective (20) should be minimized over all transfer functionsG that by definition must satisfy the constraint
Note that in (20), we can show that we recover the expression (15) of the performance of the ZFE mechanism in the limit P u (e j ω ) → ∞. To obtain a lower bound on performance (for diagonal prefilters), we now minimize the performance measure (20) over the choice of diagonal prefilters G satisfying (21) . First, in the case where P u (e j ω ) is positive definite and diagonal for all ω, i.e., the different input signals are uncorrelated, we have in fact an allocation problem whose solution is of the "waterfilling type" [44] . Namely, denote P u (e j ω ) = diag(p 1 (e j ω ), . . . , p m (e j ω )) and
Omitting the expression e j ω in the integrals for clarity, (20) and (21) read
and the solution to this convex problem is
where λ > 0 is adjusted so that the solution satisfies the equality constraint (21) (note that since (22) is not smooth, we would have to approximate this solution if we wanted to implement the corresponding G with a finite-dimensional filter). Problems of this type are discussed in the communication literature on joint transmitter-receiver optimization [27] , [28] , which is not too surprising in view of our approximation setup on Fig. 1 . When P u (e j ω ) is not diagonal, it is shown in [28] that the problem can be reduced to the diagonal case if G can be arbitrary; however, the argument does not appear to carry through under our constraint that G must also be diagonal. Nonetheless, one can obtain a solution arbitrarily close to the minimum one using semidefinite programming. First, we discretize the optimization problem at the set of frequencies ω q = qπ N , q = 0, . . . , N. Note that all functions are even functions of ω; hence, we can restrict out attention to the interval [0, π]. Then, we define the m(N + 1) variables x iq = x i (e j ω q ), with x iq ≥ 0, and X q = diag(x 1q , . . . , x m q ). Using the trapezoidal rule to approximate the integrals, we obtain the following optimization problem:
q by taking the Schur complement. The optimization problem (23) , (24) is a semidefinite program (SDP) and can thus be solved efficiently even for a relatively fine discretization of the interval [0, π]. Assuming such a sufficiently fine discretization, the value obtained from solving the SDP provides a lower bound on the performance achievable by any LMMSE mechanism using a diagonal prefilter G and a deconvolution Wiener filter H (or even smoother).
2) Pre-and Postfilter Design: We single out here two prefilters G of interest to construct practical LMMSE mechanisms. The first is simply the square root prefilter of Theorem 7. By using it, we improve on the ZFE mechanism, assuming that the statistical assumptions on u are satisfied. Another possible prefilter G is the one obtained from solving the SDP above. The transfer functionsG ii (and hence G ii ) of the filterG can then be obtained by interpolation of their squared magnitude x i (e j ω ) from the variables x iq and m spectral factorizations. Note that the resulting filter G would only be optimal in the LMMSE family if we were using a Wiener smoother H, i.e., if we relaxed the causality constraint on H.
Assuming that G(z) is chosen to be rational and with our standing assumption that P u is rational, then P v is rational as well, and note from (18) 
B. Example: Events Generated by Markovian Dynamics
We illustrate through a simple example that performance improvement over the ZFE mechanism is possible when we take into account additional public information about the input signals, as described in the previous subsection. Consider a server (shared computing resource, clerk in an administrative office, etc.) processing jobs submitted by customers, and which can be either idle or busy. An event is recorded when the server switches from one state to the other. One way of representing this system is via the Markov chain model with four states shown in Fig. 5 , with an event being generated when the server enters the intermediary states s 1 and s 2 , in which it can only stay for one time period. The events recorded at the transition times should be kept private. For example, in a shared computing environment, processing times and patterns could provide some information about the jobs submitted by a user that he or she does not want to disclose [45] . On the other hand, we assume that the parameters α and β governing the transition probabilities and shown in Fig. 5 are public information representing known aggregate statistics about the server dynamics.
For a general time-homogeneous finite-state Markov chain {x t } t with N states, we can assume without loss of generality that the state space is the set of N -dimensional basis vectors denoted {e 1 , . . . , e N }, with e ij = δ ij . Denote the N -by-N transition probability matrix Π, with elements Π ij = P (x t+1 = e i |x t = e j ). Assume moreover that the chain is ergodic (irreducible and aperiodic) and stationary, and introduce the column vector p of stationary probabilities, i.e., p i = P (x t = e i ), so that Πp = p. Note that with this encoding of the states, we have E[x t ] = p. For convenience, we also introduce the 0-mean sequencex t = x t − p, taking values in {ẽ 1 , . . . ,ẽ N } withẽ i = e i − p. Finally, let D = diag(p 1 , . . . , p N ) . Then, one can show [46] that the z-spectrum of the sequencex t is
where H = Π − p1 T . We use this formalism to represent the server dynamics above via the Markov chain of 
with N 1 = 50 and N 2 = 25. We can take k 1 = k 2 = 1 in the adjacency relation since the signals u i,t switch between values separated by 1. Fig. 6 shows an example of sample paths obtained using the ZFE mechanism and the LMMSE mechanism replacing the inverse postfilter of the ZFE mechanism by a Wiener filter. In this case, choosing the prefilter obtained from solving the optimization problem (23) (optimal for the Wiener smoother) gives a worse error. Then, for the same two mechanisms providing ( , δ)-differential privacy, Fig. 7 shows the RMSE obtained for δ = 0.05 and different values of . We also plot the performance lower bounds for ZFE mechanisms with general prefilters (Theorem 8) and for LMMSE mechanisms for any diagonal prefilter [solution of (23) ]. We can see that ZFE mechanisms become quickly unusable as become small, i.e., when a significant amount of privacy preserving noise is introduced, even if we could optimize over general prefilters rather than just diagonal ones. Recall in particular from (16) and (14) that the dependence on the privacy parameters and δ of both the diagonal ZFE mechanism performance and of the lower bound is captured completely by the multiplicative factor κ δ, . This is not the case for the LMMSE mechanism however, since the Wiener filter takes the privacy noise variance into account. Moreover, for the LMMSE mechanism, we see that there is in this case little performance to gain by further optimizing the diagonal prefilter, or even by replacing the postfilter by a noncausal smoother.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed several approximations of MIMO filters that enforce differential privacy guarantees, while attempting to minimize the impact on performance of this privacy specification. An optimal ZFE mechanism extending the mechanism in [14] and [15] was obtained for the approximation of SIMO filters, and a suboptimal one considering only diagonal prefilters was obtained for general MIMO filters, together with a bound on the performance achievable with nondiagonal prefilters. We also illustrated the significant performance gain that can be expected by leveraging a model of the input signals, in this case on the second-order statistics, especially for high privacy levels (i.e., high noise levels, small δ, ).
The architecture of Fig. 1 considered here for the privacy mechanisms appears to be in fact quite generic. It decomposes the problem into a standard estimation problem, for which many alternative techniques could be used depending on the scenario considered, and a first-stage privacy-preserving filter optimization problem. Natural extensions of this work include considering higher performance equalizers such as decision-feedback equalizers (see [1] for the SISO case) and designing mechanisms that work more naturally with relaxations of the adjacency relation allowing users to activate the same sensor multiple times.
